was a magnificent experience. I've never been to anything like it-and the old Dean is a most wonderful man. He just exudes strength and goodness-and he made a great impression on everyone who heard him. It certainly gave a Peace Movement a fillip here … 4 preparing, secretly, for war-converged. With the 1953 Australian Convention on Peace and War, they collided.
The Convention and the debates it provoked provide a sharp insight into the polarising impact of Cold War. This article will use the Convention as a case study of the character of anti-communism in the 1950s. It will argue that, despite the successful efforts of the organisers to ensure that the Convention was not communist-controlled-and I will suggest that it was neither inspired nor manipulated by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA)-the climate of virulent anticommunism prevented the Menzies' government and the security services from perceiving distinctions. Within the moral myopia of the Cold War, any peace activity was seen as subversive. Nuances and ambiguities simply did not exist. The 1953 Convention was a clear exception to the usual pattern of CPA control over the peace movement in the 1950s, but the prevailing political environment necessarily linked peace with communism. Pacifist clergymen who opposed the Korean War or the development of nuclear weapons were therefore tarred with the communist brush. There could be no such thing as legitimate opposition to government policy on war and peace. On these issues, as we shall see, conservative anti-communism decreed that all critics-whether or not they were communist-must be silenced. The second aim is rectify a significant historiographical oversight. Notwithstanding a comprehensive if partisan discussion of the Convention by one of its organisers, 10 and a vast amount of relevant archival material, 11 the event has been largely overlooked not only by historians of the post-war period but, more surprisingly, by historians of the peace movement. 12 The one exception is a brief discussion in a broad-ranging chapter on peace activities throughout the 1950s. 13 Thirdly, I will attempt to illustrate how fractured were the early to mid 1950s; the article will reveal this period to contain severe sectarian, cultural and ideological fault lines. It will therefore contribute to and supplement an emerging historiography 14 that contests the received wisdom of the 1950s as years of 'suburban stability and security', a period of 'complacency, conformity [and] . Each of these activities was preceded by innumerable public meetings to popularise as well as to fund-raise, each involved vast amounts of printed propaganda material and organisational effort, and each was challenged, attacked or undermined by the Menzies government. In addition to these major events, a plethora of activities was also undertaken: newspaper advertisements, letters to the editor, receptions, petition signing, art exhibitions, dances, fairs, forums. For example, in the first six months of 1953, the Victorian Peace Council or its affiliate, the Peace Quest Forum, organised the following: a delegation to Canberra to request the Menzies government to press for a ceasefire in Korea; a three-day citizens' conference on peace and disarmament in the Assembly Hall in Collins Street; a Big Gala Peace Ball in North Melbourne Town Hall; a 'clemency vigil' outside the US Consulate protesting against the imminent execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; screenings at numerous suburban and rural Town Halls and churches of the Joris Ivens film Peace Will Win; 16 a well-attended ceasefire rally on the Yarra Bank; and weekly lunch-hour forums in the Assembly Hall. Speakers at these weekly forums included the Olympics athletics coach Percy Cerrutty, on 'Youth for Battlefields or Playing Fields'; the historian, Norman Harper, on 'Should the United Nations 17 The range and frequency of these activities was symptomatic of the increasingly broad front that the peace movement was attempting to capture. They also provided a strong organisational base for planning the September Convention on Peace and War. The Convention was the brainchild of Reverend Allan D. Brand, a Methodist Minister of Glebe and president of the New South Wales Peace Council. He returned from the Vienna Peace Congress in early 1953 convinced 'that instead of leaving it to governments, the people themselves, through open discussion of many viewpoints, could begin to determine vital policies and events'. 18 He and a group of ten clergymen, mostly Protestant, drew up a statement summarised by its concluding sentence: 'Peace cannot wait-it must be won'. 19 Peace would triumph when negotiation displaced war in the settlement of international disputes. This position was confirmed, it seemed, by the cessation, through negotiation, of the three year-old Korean war in July. 20 An executive committee, consisting mostly of Anglican and Protestant clergymen was formed, the first of eight Convention Bulletins was published, halls were booked, invitations issued, sponsors secured, and an intensive publicity campaign commenced. 21 With three thousand delegates anticipated, expectations were high and aims were grandiose: to 'demonstrate the desire of the Australian people for peace' and to 'challenge the government to frame policies that strengthen peace'.
The response by the Government will be discussed later but from the outset a major obstacle confronting those preparing for the Convention was the virtual blackout imposed by the media. The organisers were denied the normal channels of publicity: the press, radio and advertising space on trains, trams, ferries and buses. This was neither a unique nor recent phenomenon and, to many activists on the Left, quite predictable. But it ambushed Protestant 252 clergymen unaccustomed to the heavy hand of censorship. As an indignant Reverend J.F. Long, wrote: 'there is no justification for [this] Press blanket … [that] has prevented the public from knowing what is going on.' 22 The Victorian Convention Committee devised various means of breaking the 'conspiracy of silence'. First, it solicited donations for the specific purpose of buying substantial space in the Age, Argus and Herald to advertise both the Convention on Peace and War and the preparatory meetings in Melbourne's Assembly Hall. These were held on 7 August, 15 August and 11 September. Second, it communicated with 'all ministers of religion, doctors, lawyers and other professional and business men' in particular localities, requested that one or some of them convene a local meeting, and arranged a Committee member to address such a meeting. 23 Third, it compiled mailing lists of people 'of the widest possible character and high standing', drawn from 'all religious, political and other affiliations'. Members of the Committee then interviewed or, more often, wrote to these people seeking their assistance. Sometimes the plea fell on deaf ears so at least one circular contained a tone of desperation: 'Please do what you can, and please-please-PLEASE do it immediately' 24 For ten weeks the Convention committee and a large swag of volunteers prepared for those five days in September. The organisers desired an ecumenical gathering. They desired 'to bring together all lines of thought, to discover what basis of agreement is possible'. 25 The programme was structured so that sectional domination by any of the participating organisations would be prevented. 26 Individual participants, each paying £1 registration fee, would have full speaking, voting and/or abstention rights. In addition, a broad range of 'special sections' was planned. They embraced women, youth, trade unionists, scientists, and people from Churches, business and cultural pursuits. 27 As one the Convention committee members stated: 'We will be a very mixed bunch of people. If anybody goes to [the Convention] with an axe to grind, than I am sorry for him. He is going to find himself out of touch. For this Convention will belong to the people who attend and to the people of Australia'. 28 Thus, the Convention was to be inclusive of opinion, broad in representation and ecclesiastical in emphasis.
The Convention
The This is a historic moment in the life of Australia. We must recognise that we are all Australians prepared to bridge the divisions in the cause of peace. We are here to find our own common humanity. If war came along tomorrow unity would be our keynote. We have to capture that spirit in the service of peace, and show the people of Australia that we have found this communion with each other, this sense of being one people in one God, one people in the eyes of eternity. 29 According to Geoff Chapman, an observer, his speech was 'very impressive' and his 'sincerity was obvious'. 30 Given that none of the major Sydney newspapers sent a reporter to cover any aspect of the Convention, the report of Chapman, a member of the Melbourne University Students' Representative Council, gives us a unique account of the five days of the Convention. His report was neither partisan nor sanitised. 31 After attending Sub-Commission A1 (whose brief was to find consensus around the question 'Are peaceful solutions possible in present war and war-danger areas?'), he commented: The following day there was a groundswell of support for a more inclusive and less doctrinaire approach. According to Chapman, 'had yesterday's performance continued, I would have been obliged to withdraw'. 33 He stayed until the end, taking detailed notes on the debates, addresses and resolutions. He also described how some discussions were 'heated' (particularly in relation to the issue of recognition of China) or 'disorderly' or 'nebulous' and how one unanswered question posed by Dame Mary Gilmore ('Why are A bombs let off in the desert instead of on the ice caps at the North and South poles?') left the audience, understandably, 'puzzled'. 34 Such qualitative judgements are absent from the 'official' published versions of the Convention. 35 His summation of the Convention therefore would appear to have a large measure of authenticity and reliability.
Although the Convention was broadly representative of the Australian community in that delegates came from all states and from many occupations, it was not a genuine cross section of Australian political opinion, for it was obvious that most of the delegates were more or less of left wing sympathy. Right wing views were considered, but there was really no one there to advance them … His subsequent remarks are highly pertinent in the light of the allegations made by Menzies, ASIO and other government departments-discussed belowthat the Convention was communist inspired, controlled or influenced.
The most striking feature of the Convention was the very sincerity and enthusiasm of those present. During the discussions on the drafts they made really honest efforts to find areas of agreement and to effect compromises … [They] showed good faith and generosity and subdued their personal opinions to find common ground … Everyone was free to say what they liked and had every opportunity to do so … Standard of discussion was on the whole low, and points to a very real need for extended Adult Education facilities … [The Convention] was dominated by no particular group or political party… 36 None of these comments is characteristic of meetings organised or conducted by the Communist Party of Australia during its Cold War embrace of 'high Stalinism'. In fact, stated Chapman, 'it was very interesting to see a Communist Party member, known for his keen mind and decisive personality, refraining from any constructive part in the proceedings'. It is unnecessary to detail the content of the speeches, the deliberations of the sub-committees or the findings of the Convention. 38 It is quite clear from the testimony of those delegates attended and reported back to their respective organisations that the Convention succeeded in its objectives. Genuine 'shop floor' democratic participation had occurred, the divisions of varied political, social and occupational backgrounds was bridged, and a collective spirit united by working for peace not preparing for war was achieved. Most important the principle of patient negotiation-which was as much an organising strategy as a philosophical position-was enthusiastically endorsed.
Besieged
But these achievements were both shallow and pyrrhic. The Convention was boycotted, subverted, censored and condemned. The Prime Minister attacked it, ASIO monitored it, government departments undermined it, and the press-as we have seen-ignored it. The role of ASIO was especially ubiquitous. Since 1950, it took a close interest in peace activity. In 1951, it created a special subsection devoted exclusively to the peace movement which, soon after, it had successfully penetrated. 39 In late July 1953, ASIO requested the Department of Immigration to refer to it any application to enter Australia to attend the Convention from any 'Communist or Fellow Traveller'. No action was to be taken against 'British subjects'. But because of the instruction that 'if an application deemed by Australian Security Intelligence Organisation here to be security risk application will be refused', ASIO and the Immigration Department did prevent or deter entry from 'aliens' with a non-British background who were invited. These included Albert Einstein from the United States, Dimitri Shostakovitch from the Soviet Union and Emil Zatopek from Czechoslovakia. 40 ASIO interference also occurred in more prosaic ways. The principal of Melbourne University's Women's College, Myra Roper, disclosed in late July 1953 that she had been interviewed by a 'security policeman' inquiring whether one of the College's students had been involved in peace activity. 41 Roper commented that people who were asked to speak on a peace platform now had 44 In a long statement to the House of Representatives on 16 September, just ten days before the Convention commenced, he alleged communist manipulation so duplicitous, in fact, that 'some of the gentlemen who thought they were initiating the Convention were unaware of its having any connexion with the … Communist party'. Menzies argued that It is recognised Communist technique to endeavour to attract to such conferences persons of standing who are not Communists. The association of good people with these conferences, people with standing, with not a hint of Communism in them, is an end in itself. In addition, their names are used to add prestige to the individual conference, to any resolutions serving Communist ends which emerge from that conference, and to the 'Peace' movement generally. 45 An angry Reverend Owen-one of the 'duped gentlemen'-took up the cudgels and sought a private meeting with Menzies to assure him that there was no Communist Party control. This took place in Melbourne on the morning of Monday 21 September. 46 Owen's interesting account of that meeting was written only a few months later. There seems little reason to doubt its reliability.
I gave Mr Menzies the whole story as I knew it. I told him that I knew Communists were interested and were active on the fringe of the movement. But I indicated the care that we had taken to see that no Communists were allowed to contribute to the actual shaping of the Convention and … the steps I had taken to prevent this movement from being turned Menzies was true to his word and modified his accusations. He told Parliament on 22 September that his attack on the Convention was not an attack upon eminent churchmen. The Rev Owen, he said, was 'a man whose judgement I regret, but whose integrity is beyond doubt'. He acknowledged that Owen was 'a man of high standing' who was not a Communist. 48 However, he repeated his charge of communist manipulation of the Convention, a charge that will be discussed later in this article. Menzies' two parliamentary statements, on 16 and 22 September, set the tone for a series of denunciations of the Convention, some vitriolic, from numerous high-ranking government members including Richard Casey, Harold Holt and John Gorton. All these were given widespread publicity in the daily press. Letters favourable to the Convention, meanwhile, languished on the editor's desk. 49 The Liberal government was joined by the Labor Opposition, influenced by its pre-Split Catholic right constituency, which repudiated the Convention and threatened members with expulsion if they attended. 50 The political offensive was paralleled by a sectarian skirmish. Historically, this sectarianism had a dark, subterranean presence but, as is well-known, erupted in 1954-55 during the convulsive split in the Labor Party. It was also a divisive element in 1953 and provided another ingredient in the anti-communist brew that washed over the Convention. The Catholic press achieved unanimity in its condemnation of the peace movement. 51 The Catholic Tribune simultaneously attacked Protestantism and Communism:
The controversy about the 'Peace Convention' in Sydney has served to underline a recent development in Communist 'infiltration' which is significant and ominous-namely, the growing sympathy among Protestant clergymen for certain ideals … favoured by Red propagandists … [They] believe that Communism is not, in fact, the evil thing that it has been represented, and that it really stands up for the causes of human well-being and peace … 52
In another editorial Tribune described the apparent tendency of Protestant ministers to align themselves with communists in joint peace activity as 'a grievous matter' and an insult to all Christians who suffered 'ferocious' persecution under communist regimes. 53 The Catholic Advocate headlined the Convention as the 'Latest Move in Communist World Plan' and condemned those 'well-meaning ministers of religion', along with other 'Parlour Pinks' and 'fellow travellers', for supporting such a 'a bogus front' with such 'sinister ends'. 54 After the Convention it devoted a long editorial to 'The Phenomenon of the "Pink Parson"' in which it accused 'a large and respectable group' of leading Protestant clergymen for their 'dangerous softness'. While they denied, sometimes 'violently', all personal sympathy with the Communist creed, they continually echoed the Communist line in their public statements. Thus, it was 'difficult to be patient with them', these '"modern-minded" Protestants' who, in effect, refused 'to stand for God against His enemies'. 55 The Catholic Weekly similarly-and sanctimoniously-scorned the 'group of gullible and impressionable protestant clergymen' who had been seduced by the Communist Party into thinking they were 'the inspirers and promoters of the Convention' 56 And, of course, the Convention and its 'pro-Communist clergymen' supporters were condemned, prominently and stridently, in successive issues of B.A. Santamaria's News-Weekly. 57 The singlemindedness of Catholic opinion in relation to this issue was disturbed only by two letters from individual Catholics-Brian Buckley and Vernon Rice-who expressed support for the goals of the Convention. 58 Convention is the Communist Party. Mr Menzies has told us that in Parliament …' 59 It instructed its readers not to co-operate with or 'lend one's name' to the Convention since this would endorse its communist line. This injunction pained the Reverend Owen. In the same paper, weeks after the Convention ended, he wrote: 'As I listened to men and women [at the Convention] sincerely struggling toward mutual understanding and agreement, I felt myself saddened beyond measure to think that my church, misguidedly standing out of this movement, was missing this magnificent opportunity'. 60 Misguided it may have been but the effect on the Convention of this combined assault was to seriously dent its chance of success. An early casualty was one of the original organisers and joint chairmen of the Convention Committee, the Reverend Dr A. H. Wood. His involvement in peace activity commenced in 1945, with Hiroshima: 'I felt that the whole world had changedwar with atomic bombs could never be just'. 61 After Menzies' parliamentary attack, which left him 'saddened beyond words', 62 he withdrew his support and involvement. Harold Wood was the Principal of Methodist Ladies' College and he felt obliged to resign-even though he remained convinced that communists were not in any way connected to the Convention. The minutes of the Convention Executive Committee meeting of 19 September indicate his personal dilemma. 'I am torn between my duty as a Christian and my obligations to the School. People who do not know all the facts will criticise me as Head of my school and the School will suffer'. 63 It was not certainly Wood whom Eric Owen had in mind when he stated that 'official disapproval was sufficient to induce some people to retire from the [Convention] movement with almost indecent haste'. 64 In contrast to Wood, one of the Convention's organising secretaries, Reverend Long, stated: 'I have no intention of withdrawing. I shall go on with the noble work for peace I have been doing for 40 years-long before I ever heard of communism'. 65 Wood's action received considerable publicity; Long's decision received none.
The political fall out also expressed itself in several other ways. One was the attendance figure. In the weeks prior to the Convention, organisers confidently and repeatedly predicted that more than three thousand would participate; in the end, only 947 attended. Similarly, it was anticipated that 'at least 500 delegates will go from Victoria;' 66 only 174 arrived. Eighty-four arrived from other states and there was one overseas delegate, from New Zealand. Young people had especially been targeted and high hopes were held out for a 'Youth Forum' at the Convention. 67 In the end, a mere forty three delegates classed as 'Youth & Students' attended. 68 As the Anglican commented: 'The moral is clear. Many who could have taken a constructive part in this Convention did not do so. They had been intimidated by a "smear" campaign against it in advance'. 69 Attendance figures are, of course, only one criterion of success. The extent to which the mobilisation of opinion occurs outside the meeting halls is, arguably, a more significant if less quantifiable measure. But given the indefatigable efforts of the State Convention Committees-or at least the Victorian Committee as revealed in the minutes of its meetings-the number of final participants must have disappointed. There was not only withdrawal of interest. Permission to use several municipal halls for meetings, film screenings and social functions was also withdrawn. 70 This forced hurried relocations to less central and congenial venues. At one stage even the all-important opening venue, the Sydney Town Hall was withdrawn by the City of Sydney municipal council. 71 The various Convention Committees, with their limited sources of funding, 72 were no match against the more powerful forces of a hostile parliament, press and a range of government instrumentalities. 66 Murray-Smith papers, SLV, MS 8272 Box 282/6-1, Circular, 17 August. 67 
Fighting peace
So what underlay Menzies' war on peace? Few analyses of his government's position extend beyond the 'McCarthyist Cold War atmosphere' explanation and they emphasise his visceral, almost irrational, hostility to communism. But such an explanation begs the question as to why the Menzies government was so obsessively concerned-and it was a genuine, not contrived concernabout the peace movement. There were a range of contextual influences that moulded Menzies' views in the run-up to the 1953 Convention. Perhaps the most important was the defence and global war preparations within Australia and the mobilisation of the national security state. 73 Menzies' believed-to use the striking phrase of one government document-that peace activity would 'morally cripple the government's rearmament programme' 74 by distracting the attention of many Australians away from the menace of international communism. 75 Other factors included the outbreak of the Korean War, which intensified both domestic anti-communist feeling and the sense of impending international crisis, 76 the revelations overseas of communist spy rings and espionage operations, which appeared to confirm the existence of a 'fifth column' 77 and the perception that, in the now likely event of a third world war, the Communist Party would act as a subversive agency of a foreign enemy-a perception aided by the Party's own actions and language. 78 There was a further, important determinant of Menzies' response. It was his conviction that the Australian peace movement followed closely the directives of the World Peace Council which, essentially, was a Cominform creation. 79 By 1953, Menzies had access to ample convincing evidence from the Department of External Affairs, Naval Intelligence, and the British Foreign Office (via the Information Research Department) that elaborated and validated these links. 80 It was a short step to the belief that the Convention on Peace and War in effect if not in intent assisted the so-called 'Peace Offensive' of the Soviet Union. Part of that 'offensive' was to use the peace movement to sow discord within society, weaken the resolve and the defence efforts of the West, and compromise the peacekeeping role of the UN.
Stripped, therefore, of its colourful language, Menzies would have had little difficulty accepting this assessment made by an External Affairs officer prior to the Convention:
The Peace Movement is a revolutionary movement, a cloak by which the Soviet leaders hope to dissimulate Great Russian Imperialism. Conscious that its guise has been penetrated and exposed in many quarters, it continually seeks fresh means to ensnare the wary. Like shady night club proprietors the Communist promoters are no sooner put out of business by exposure in one place than they are busy organising a fresh venture under entirely new management. 81 The Convention on Peace and War constituted such a 'fresh venture': another strategy in the Cold War that must be exposed and discredited. Menzies' conviction that the Convention was a communist front under 'new management' was articulated in his 'Man to Man' national broadcast on 25 September 1953:
The Communists are very clever men, naturally much cleverer than their dupes. Their designs are so treacherous and evil that they would never succeed in Australia except in disguise. The best Communist disguise, one which they have assumed in almost every free country, is to put up a 'front', a public showing, which appears to be exactly opposite to Communism … Thus, atheistic Communism, the arch-enemy of Christianity, is willing to come in behind a Christian clergyman and use his name, provided that he is sufficiently unaware … It creeps up behind this peace-loving Christian and, by devious means, encourages a peace propaganda … [I]t is time that we recognised that Communist inspired peace movements in the democracies are the counterpart of a vast and menacing growth of war power in the Soviet Union. 82 All this was anathema to the non-communist Christian clergymen who sponsored the Australian Convention on Peace and War. For them 'defence policy' was a euphemism for an armaments build-up. For them, to remain silent or inert was to remain an accomplice in the government's war preparations. And for them, nothing could sanctify modern war; nothing could defile the cause of peace. Better relations between East and West was their goal, patient negotiation their favoured means. And they denied vigorously and repeatedly that they were hoodwinked by clever communist manipulators. By reducing them to dupes, such allegations denigrate their intelligence, integrity and capacity to think in ways independent from but, at least in peace work, parallel to the CPA. Many clergymen and most of the Convention organisers, such as St. Clair Anderson, Owen, Brand, Long and Wood, had commenced their involvement with the peace movement long before peace activists were seen as synonymous with fellow travellers and crypto communists and long before the communist-influenced Australian Peace Council was formed in July 1949. 83 A Communist 'front'?
The broader issue of Communist Party control of the Australian Peace Council (APC) has been extensively canvassed. 84 Suffice it to say that despite constant denials from the APC, 85 the Communist Party was the early driving force behind it. This close involvement in the establishment of the APC was confirmed by an 'insider'-its first organising secretary, Ian Turner: 'The post-war Australian peace movement had its origin in a top-secret meeting of party members … early in 1949. That meeting agreed to initiate a broadly-based Australian Peace Council'. 86 This issue, of CPA initiation of postwar peace activism, is not of direct relevance here but the extent of CPA control over the 1953 Convention is. The alleged communist connection was the linchpin of the combined assault on the Convention and the effectiveness with which the charges were hurled severely circumscribed its success. Menzies' claim that the Convention was a communist front relied heavily on his use of information, intelligence and internal CPA documents supplied by ASIO. The evidence Menzies used in his statement to the House was an address 'to a select [Communist] Party group' by an unnamed high-ranking member; a resolution 'passed by a senior Committee of the Communist Party' outlining tactics to be used at the Convention; the decision by the CPA to establish 'a working committee for the Convention''; and the directive to a member of the Central Committee to assume 'general political leadership and responsibility of the Convention'. 87 The following day newspapers headlined his speech with 'P.M. Reveals Top Red's Order to Party' and 'Communists Behind Peace Convention, Says P.M.' 88 The 'secret documents' from which Menzies-and press political reporters-generously quoted gave the allegations verisimilitude. Assertion was fast becoming fact. But not for those who were actually organising the Convention.
Immediately after Reverend J.E. Owen met with Menzies on 21 September, he met with ASIO. In a remarkable twist, Menzies arranged by phone, possibly with Spry himself, that Owen see the actual ASIO documents: 'Show him everything, anything he wants to look at'. 89 To see classified documents dealing with communism, especially in 1953, was highly irregular but Menzies was anxious that Owen, whom he obviously trusted, be convinced of communist complicity. Owen pored over the incriminating documents with the Director General and the officer 'in charge of the file' and saw names, connections and affiliations. According to Spry, 'it appeared to me that he had been if not convinced, at least surprised by the documents produced'. 90 In fact, Owen was not convinced: 'I saw the names of men whom I had long suspected of being Communists … I saw the names of men who had kept their affiliations with the Communist Party as discreetly hidden as they could, but … I saw no names that I or my friends had not already suspected.' 91 What Owen discovered is that ASIO, and therefore Menzies, had conflated two peace conventions-one planned but never held by the Communist Party; the other, with which he was associated, due to commence in five days' time. This was a remarkable revelation. It certainly cast Menzies' parliamentary statement in a different light. Owen felt ASIO acknowledged, albeit perfunctorily, that its 'proof' was circumstantial rather than prima facie. When he finished examining all the 'secret documents', he asked the officers present:
Will you let me sum up what I have seen, and then tell me if I am correct or not? … I believe that you have evidence here that the Communists planned to hold one of their Peace Conferences in Sydney early in this year; that subsequently they got wind of the fact that we were in the field; that they then decided to drop theirs and swing in behind ours; that they have been very close to the movement in Sydney in the planning of the machinery of the Convention; but there is no evidence that they have either wished to influence the nature of the Convention, the matter to be discussed, the manner of discussing it, or the conclusions to be arrived at, or have succeeded in doing so. One of the men replied, 'I think that is fairly accurate'. 92 If this testimony is reliable, and comments from both sides of the political fence regarding Owen's integrity 93 suggest that it would be, then the edifice, upon which allegations of communist control rested, collapses. The file that ASIO compiled, that Owen saw and that Menzies used is now available to historians. The key documents were a set of eleven small note-pad size pages taken from the 'left side drawer of J.D. Blake's desk' at CPA headquarters in Sydney, and a three page set of rough and rather disorganised notes taken from the 'gent's wardrobe' at the home of H.B. Chandler. 94 The authors of these notes-the first was handwritten, the second typed-were not identified. However it is clear that the handwriting, scrawled and nearly illegible, belonged to Jack Blake. 95 It is not clear whether ASIO knew this; if so, which is likely, it would gleefully have interpreted 'we ask responsible citizens to join with us in leading and preparing this great convention' as conclusive proof of communist initiation and manipulation. Blake, after all, was in 1953 a member of the highest-ranking CPA committee-the three person Central Committee Secretariat-and, arguably, the most influential CPA leader until forced to resign in 1954 after an internal power struggle. 96 So this document was a real catch. Except that Owen was right: it referred to a communist-organised National Peace Convention which the Central Committee previously planned. With the emergence of the Australian Convention on Peace and War, initiated by the clergy-based Peace Quest Committee, the Communist Party switched strategy: 'we have had to change those plans and make different ones'. 97 Further, if less authoritative, evidence that the Convention was not a 'Red Front' comes from the Communist Party's own assessment of the event. Identical editorials, written by J.D. Blake, appeared in the communist papers Tribune and The Guardian. After applauding the work of the Convention and attacking the methods of the Menzies government (it used 'every weapon in the arsenal of the secret police from crude forgery to outright intimidation'), they stated:
By negotiation, discussion and a genuine spirit of give and take, the Convention reached conclusions of a limited character which were acceptable to all participants. There are some aspects of these findings with which we do not agree, but they express the views of non-Communist people who desire peace. On all other matters contained in the unanimous findings of the Convention the Communist Party has a much more farreaching policy, and the Party will continue its own work for this policy. 98 Notwithstanding Blake's policy, throughout 1952-53, of broadening the peace movement and, correspondingly, diminishing Party domination, such a statement-with its caveats and qualifications-would be unthinkable were the Convention a creature of the Communist Party. A comparison with the 1952 Youth Carnival for Peace and Friendship also held in Sydney, is instructive. That major event was organised primarily by the CPA via a 'front' organisation, the Eureka Youth League. In none of the many assessments of the Carnival, public or internal, did the Party allude to any aspect being of 'limited character' or a source of disagreement. Instead the lessons drawn were necessarily profound, salutary, far-reaching. 99 With the Carnival, the Party was omnipotent; with the Convention, it was subordinate. The ideological myopia of cold warriors blurred such subtleties. It prevented distinctions being seen between desire and outcome, influence and control. The Cold War polarities meant that, in the 1950s, any peace work ipso facto assisted, or was assisted by, the Communist Party. Guilt by association, that emblematic feature of this troubled, tense period, applied to the peace movement. Peace parsons, if not already pink, were easily duped and therefore made naive but valuable allies on the side of Soviet communism in the great world struggle for moral and military supremacy.
Legacy
The aftermath of the Convention saw 'report back' meetings and rallies in October 1953. 100 But the heady rhetoric expressed on the final evening of the Convention-'we will save the peace of Australia and we will save the peace of the world'-withered beyond the Convention halls where the Cold War air was far more chilly. Soon, audiences dwindled and preaching was to the converted. The hoped-for momentum inspired by those days in September that would sweep up masses of previously uncommitted Australians to the cause of peace quickly ebbed as 1953 drew to a close. of the Convention, fell collectively silent on previously-announced plans to hold a further National Peace Convention in Melbourne in 1954. 101 In fact, even if Menzies had not announced the Petrov defection in April 1954, against which the peace movement could not compete and with which it would, most likely, have been tarred with the broad brush of espionage, it seems highly improbable that any significant peace activity would have been undertaken in 1954. This was a far cry from the frenetic activity, outlined at the outset of this article, in the early 1950s. Not for another six years, with the 1959 Peace Congress in Melbourne, was anything on the scale of the 1953 Convention attempted. The Menzies Government had succeeded in discrediting, isolating and marginalising the peace movement.
Besides the shaft of light it throws on the broader issue of anti-communism in the early 1950s, particularly the alleged synonymy of peace and communism, an examination of the Australian Convention on Peace and War revises our customary perceptions of the post-war years, 'our contemporary imaginings of a flat, complacent and largely uneventful period'. 102 It reveals that the twin issues of war and peace made the early 1950s a turbulent and fragmented period. These issues were interpreted in radically different ways by different sections of society. They were, therefore, a source of tension rather than consensus. The invasion threat of World War II united, at least temporarily, the community. The apocalyptic threat of World War III strained and polarised it. On the battleground of the Cold War a wide gulf existed between the combatants; any effort to enter the no-man's land of political neutrality, such as the attempt by the Convention clergymen, was condemned. In this sense the friction between the Menzies government and the peace movement foreshadowed some of the bitter conflicts that characterised Australian society fifteen years later during the Vietnam war. But by then 'peace' was no longer such a wicked word.
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